



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BILLS AND NOTES — DEFENSES — NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRAWER OF A CHECK AS A DEFENSE TO THE DRAWEE BANK. — The president of a corporation left checks, blank except for his signature, with the manager to be used during his absence as the necessities of business demanded. Two of the checks, which were carelessly left exposed, were taken by a business caller and cashed by the drawee bank. The first check exhausted the corporation's deposit, but the bank cashed the second, notwithstanding, and reimbursed itself from a subsequent deposit. The corporation now sues to recover its deposits. *Held*, that it may not recover either. *S. S. Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County*, 182 S. W. 777 (Kansas City Court of Appeals).

In general, no liability exists on an incomplete instrument which was not delivered. Nor does the passing of an instrument from one officer of a corporate maker to another constitute delivery, since the instrument then never leaves the possession of the corporation. But because a bank is bound to pay the checks of its depositors, it is generally held that a depositor is under a duty of care not to impose liability on the bank through incomplete instruments. See *Scholfield v. Earl of Londelborough*, [1896] A. C. 514, 538; *Linick v. Nutting & Co.*, 140 App. Div. 265, 267, 125 N. Y. Supp. 93, 96. *Contra*, *Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell*, 123 Mass. 196, 201; *Marshall v. Colonial Bank*, [1906] A. C. 559. See Beven, "Young v. Grote," 23 LAW QUART. REV. 390. The same duty exists in the civil law. See 4 POTHIER, CONTRAT DE CHANGE, ed. Beignet, 516. A violation of this duty is stated by some courts to support a liability in tort. See *Kepitigalla Rubber Estates v. National Bank of India*, [1909] 2 K. B. 1010. In others, it is treated as estopping the depositor from denying the validity of the instrument. *Trust Co. America v. Conklin*, 65 Misc. 1, 119 N. Y. Supp. 367; *cf.* 23 HARV. L. REV. 306. And the leaving of incomplete checks in an exposed place, as in the principal case, has been held sufficient negligence to bar a recovery from the bank. *Snodgrass v. Sweetser*, 15 Ind. App. 682. See 2 BOLLES, LAW OF BANKING, 589. As to the overdraft, however, it seems that the plaintiff should recover, for the duty of care is ended since the bank is no longer under an obligation to pay. *Troike v. Cook, etc. Bank*, 127 Ill. App. 413; *Henderson v. U. S. National Bank*, 59 Neb. 280, 80 N. W. 898. However, if it was customary for the bank to cash the overdrafts of a depositor, it is arguable that the existence of this custom should impose on the depositor the same obligations as when the bank pays his checks under a legal duty.

CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE — CONTRACT FOR PROPORTIONATE CONTINGENT FEE — RECOVERY ON QUANTUM MERUIT. — The plaintiff, an attorney, contracted to bring a suit for the defendant for which his compensation was to be a percentage of the amount recovered. The suit was compromised while pending. The plaintiff now sues for compensation. *Held*, that he may recover on a *quantum meruit* for the services rendered. *City of Rochester v. Campbell*, 111 N. E. 420 (Ind.).

In most American jurisdictions, although not in Indiana, a provision for a contingent fee does not make a contract void for champerty. See WILLISTON'S WALD'S POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS, 3 ed., 451, note; *Scobey v. Ross*, 13 Ind. 117. And even in jurisdictions where such a contract is held void, recovery in quasi-contract for the services rendered has often been allowed. *Holloway v. Lowe*, 1 Ala. 246; *Husbands v. Cook*, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1320, 71 S. W. 508; *French v. Cunningham*, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N. E. 797; *cf.* *Rust v. Larue*, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 411. Whether champerty should avoid a contract is a disputable question of public policy. But clearly a jurisdiction which has gone on record against champerty can find no justification in allowing a *quantum meruit*. This anomalous recovery has sometimes been based upon a distinction drawn between services illegal in themselves and services, otherwise lawful, that are to be compensated for in an illegal way. *Cf.* *Gammons v. Johnson*, 69 Minn. 488, 72 N. W. 563, with *Gam-*